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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Sonnie Flores appeals from the district court’s orders relinquishing 
jurisdiction and denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of the unified sentence 
of five years, with three years fixed, imposed upon Flores’ guilty plea to felony 
eluding a peace officer.  The Idaho Supreme Court should retain this case in 
order to determine whether the Idaho Court of Appeals correctly determined in 
State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 71 P.3d 1065 (Ct. App. 2003), that a district 
court, after relinquishing jurisdiction, may use I.C.R. 35 to reconsider its 
relinquishment order, notwithstanding the language of I.C. § 19-2601(4).   
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
The state charged Flores with felony eluding a peace officer.  (R., pp.16-
17, 61-62.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Flores pled guilty and the state 
agreed to recommend a unified five-year sentence, with two years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction with a “traditional rider.”  (R., pp.84-94.)  In January 2013, 
the court imposed a unified five-year sentence, with three years fixed, but 
suspended the sentence and placed Flores on probation.  (R., pp.124-136.) 
In September 2014, the state filed a motion to revoke Flores’ probation, 
alleging Flores violated his probation by “being discharged from Cross Pointe 
Family Services,” “being discharged from MRT,” and admitting to using 
marijuana and methamphetamine.  (R., pp.140-141; see also pp.142-149.)  
Although Flores admitted violating his probation, the district court reinstated 
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Flores on probation, but ordered him to serve 41 days in jail, with credit for 11 
days.  (R., pp.179, 183-195.)       
On May 1, 2015, less than four months after his probation was reinstated, 
the state filed a second motion to revoke Flores’ probation, alleging Flores 
violated his probation “by failing to make payments toward his Court ordered 
financial obligations,” “committing a new law violation, to wit: domestic battery,” 
failing to report to his probation officer, “moving without permission or notifying 
his probation officer,” “absconding from supervision,” failing to pay supervision 
fees, “quitting his job without permission,” and “failing to submit four UA tests per 
month.”  (R., pp.197-199; see also pp.200-215.)  The state also filed a third 
motion to revoke probation on June 11, 2015, which alleged Flores violated his 
probation by providing false information to a police officer, resisting and 
obstructing a police officer, and “associating with Jose Soto without permission 
from his probation officer.”  (R., pp.227-228; see also pp.229-237.)   
Pursuant to an agreement, Flores admitted all the allegations in both 
probation violation motions, and the state “agree[d] not to file felony charges of 
Possession of Methamphetamine or Felon in Possession of a Firearm.”  (R., 
pp.253-254.)  The state also recommended, and Flores agreed to “stipulate to a 
Traditional Rider disposition”; if Flores was “not accepted into the Traditional 
Rider program,” or the Therapeutic Community, the plea agreement provided 
that the court would relinquish jurisdiction.  (R., p.254.) 
Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, the court’s order 
revoking probation and order retaining jurisdiction specifically states: “If the 
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defendant is not given either a TC or Traditional Rider, the Court intends to 
relinquish jurisdiction.”  (R., p.257 (bold omitted).)  Forty-two days after revoking 
Flores’ probation and retaining jurisdiction, the court entered an amended order, 
which states:  “If the defendant is not given an Expanded Rider, the court intends 
to relinquish jurisdiction.”1  (R., p.263 (bold omitted).)  
On December 15, 2015, approximately four months after the court first 
retained jurisdiction, the court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., 
pp.269-272.)  Flores filed an I.C.R. 35 motion, which the district court denied.  
(R., pp.274-285.)  Flores filed a timely notice of appeal from the order 
relinquishing jurisdiction and from the denial of his Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.288-




                                            
1 It appears the amended order was a result of discontinuation of the 
“Therapeutic Community Rider.”  (See R., pp.280-281 n.1 (“During the 
defendant’s participation in the Rider program, the Therapeutic Community Rider 
was discontinued and the defendant was placed on the new Extended Rider.”); 





 Flores states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished 
jurisdiction over Mr. Flores? 
 
2. Did the district court err in holding it did not have the 
authority to retain jurisdiction so that Mr. Flores could 
complete a rider program? 
 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Flores’ Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion in light of the new 
information provided in support thereof? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Has Flores failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
relinquishing jurisdiction, particularly in light of NICI’s recommendation to 
relinquish after Flores was removed from the facility because he was deemed a 
security risk?   
 
2. Should the Idaho Supreme Court retain this case and hold that 
I.C.R. 35 does not allow a district court to reinstate its jurisdiction after 
jurisdiction has been relinquished pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601(4)?  Alternatively, 
even if I.C.R. 35 may be used to reinstate jurisdiction, would reinstatement of 
jurisdiction constitute a second period of retained jurisdiction, which would be 
prohibited by § 19-2601(4) absent an intervening period of probation?  If 
reinstatement of jurisdiction would not constitute a second period of retained 
jurisdiction, must this Court remand to allow the district court to decide whether 
to grant the requested relief (reinstatement in the retained jurisdiction program) 
given that the court did not address the merits of Flores’ request in light of its 






Flores Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
Or Erred In Concluding That I.C.R. 35 Did Not Give It Authority To Reinstate Its 




 After two failed attempts at probation, the district court revoked Flores’ 
probation and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.184-188, 255-259.)  Shortly 
thereafter, and upon the recommendation of the Idaho Department of Correction, 
the district court relinquished jurisdiction.  (R., pp.267-272.)  After relinquishing 
jurisdiction, the district court denied Flores’ Rule 35 request to reinstate him in 
the retained jurisdiction program.  (R., pp.274-285.)   
On appeal, Flores asserts the district court abused its discretion in 
relinquishing jurisdiction, incorrectly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to reinstate 
Flores in the retained jurisdiction program following relinquishment, and abused 
its discretion in denying Flores’ Rule 35 motion.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)  All of 
Flores’ arguments fail.  A review of the record and the applicable law supports 
the district court’s relinquishment decision, its conclusion that it could not 
reinstate Flores in the retained jurisdiction program, and the denial of Flores’ 
Rule 35 motion.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”  State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
 
 6 
The construction and application of a statute presents a question of law, 
over which the appellate courts exercise free review.  State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 
887, 897, 231 P.3d 532, 542 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800, 
803, 172 P.3d 555, 558 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 
C. Flores Has Failed To Establish Any Error In The District Court’s Decision 
To Relinquish Jurisdiction 
 
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse 
of that discretion.  See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 
(1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 
1990).  A court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse 
of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a 
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  
State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984).  
Contrary to Flores’ assertions on appeal, a review of the record in this case 
supports the district court’s determination that Flores was not a suitable 
candidate for probation. 
Flores arrived at the North Idaho Correctional Institution (“NICI”) on 
September 21, 2015.  (PSI,2 p.44.)  Less than three months later, on December 
2, 2015, the deputy warden at NICI sent the district court a letter recommending 
that it relinquish jurisdiction.  (PSI, p.44.)  As noted by the district court, the NICI 
                                            
2 All references to the PSI are to the electronic file “Supreme Court No. 43946 
Sonnie Flores Confidential Exhibits PSI.” 
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report that recommended the court relinquish jurisdiction describes how Flores 
created and possessed gang related items and drawings and was actively 
involved in workouts that were aimed at encouraging and enforcing gang 
hierarchy and behavior.  He was also closely associated with inmates who were 
instrumental in planning and carrying out a disciplinary assault and battery on 
another inmate.  Additionally, Flores was found to have used the PIN numbers of 
nine other offenders to make personal phone calls.  Overall, NICI staff has 
concluded that Flores poses a security risk to the program and that therefore, the 
court should relinquish jurisdiction.  (R., pp.271-272 (capitalization altered); see 
also PSI, pp.47-48.)  Consistent with NICI’s recommendation, the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction.  (R., p.272.)     
 Flores contends the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction, arguing the “court failed to recognize that [his] accomplishments 
while on the retained jurisdiction were limited by the brief two month period of 
programming [he] participated in prior to being removed from the institution due 
to a pending investigation.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)  Flores, however, fails to 
“recognize” that his few “accomplishments” during his brief stay at NICI were far 
outweighed by his negative behavior, which included the activities noted in the 
district court’s decision relinquishing jurisdiction, as well as four informal 
disciplinary sanctions.  (PSI, p.47.)  Moreover, Flores was not, as he claims, 
“removed from the institution due to a pending investigation”; he was removed 
“for the safety of others” because he was deemed a security risk.  (PSI, p.50.)  
That Flores had to be removed from NICI based on the conclusion that he was 
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an “unacceptable” “security risk” was more than a sufficient basis for the court to 
relinquish jurisdiction.  (PSI, p.48.)  Flores’ abysmal behavior during his prior 
probationary terms only reinforced the conclusion that Flores was no longer a 
good candidate for probation.   
Whatever minor “accomplishments” Flores had during the review period 
fall far short of demonstrating the district court abused its discretion by 
relinquishing jurisdiction based on Flores’ removal from NICI due to security 
concerns and in light of his prior poor performance on probation.  Given any 
reasonable view of the facts, Flores has failed to establish that the district court 
abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction. 
  
D. Flores Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In 
Concluding That I.C.R. 35 Did Not Give It Authority To Reinstate Its 
Jurisdiction Following Relinquishment 
 
Two weeks after the district court relinquished jurisdiction, Flores filed a 
Rule 35 motion asking the court to “reconsider its decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction in this matter, and instruct IDOC to re-integrate [him] into the Rider 
program so that he may have a meaningful opportunity to complete the 
program.”  (R., p.277.)  The district court denied the motion, concluding it 
“lack[ed] jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.”  (R., p.281.)  In its order 
denying Flores’ requested Rule 35 relief, the court also declined to sua sponte 
reduce Flores’ underlying sentence given Flores’ “fail[ure] to present any 
information showing that the sentence originally pronounced has since that time 
become excessive.”  (R., p.284.) 
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Flores contends that the district court erroneously concluded it lacked 
jurisdiction to reinstate him in the retained jurisdiction program.  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.9.)  More specifically, Flores argues that “[t]he district court had the 
authority to continue [him] on the same rider (or a new rider) so long as it was 
within the period of retained jurisdiction.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  According to 
Flores, “a period of retained jurisdiction is not automatically terminated simply 
because the Idaho Department of Corrections [sic] sends the defendant back to 
court with a ‘relinquish’ recommendation.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  The flaw in 
Flores’ argument is that it ignores the facts.  When Flores filed his Rule 35 
motion requesting that he be placed back in the retained jurisdiction program, the 
court had already relinquished jurisdiction.  The court was not, as Flores 
suggests, merely faced with a “‘relinquish’ recommendation” – it had already 
relinquished jurisdiction.  As a result, the period of retained jurisdiction was 
terminated by the court’s order relinquishing and, once the court relinquished 
jurisdiction, Flores “remain[ed] committed to the board of correction.”  I.C. § 19-
2601(4) (“The prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if not 
affirmatively placed on probation by the court.”).   
Flores cites no authority that directly supports the proposition he 
advances – that the court “could have gone back to the order relinquishing and 
continued to retain jurisdiction over [him] and ordered him to receive rider 
programming while in the custody of the Idaho Department of Corrections [sic].”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  The only authority he references is a “see” citation to 
I.C. § 19-2601(4), and, in particular, the language that reads:  “during the period 
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of retained jurisdiction, the state board of correction shall be responsible for 
determining the placement of the prisoner and such education, programming and 
treatment as it determines to be appropriate.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  Neither 
this language, nor any other language in I.C. § 19-2601(4) actually supports 
Flores’ argument. 
Because “the best guide to legislative intent” is the words of the statute, 
the interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.  State v. Doe, 147 
Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).  Where the statutory language is 
unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law as written.  
McLean v. Maverick County Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 
(2006).  Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only one 
reasonable interpretation, it is the court’s duty to give the statute that 
interpretation.  Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 
894-896, 265 P.3d 502, 507-509 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that 
Court might not give effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was 
“palpably absurd”). 
Idaho Code § 19-2601(4) allows a district court to “[s]uspend execution of 
the judgment at any time during the first three hundred sixty-five (365) days of a 
sentence to the custody of the state board of correction.”  That section further 
states, in relevant part: 
The court shall retain jurisdiction over the prisoner for a period of 
up to the first three hundred sixty-five (365) days.  . . .  [D]uring the 
period of retained jurisdiction, the state board of correction shall be 
responsible for determining the placement of the prisoner and such 
education, programming and treatment as it determines to be 
 
 11 
appropriate.  The prisoner will remain committed to the board of 
correction if not affirmatively placed on probation by the court. 
   
I.C. § 19-2601(4).   
 The language Flores relies on only supports the conclusion it directly 
states, i.e., “during the period of retained jurisdiction,” the Department of 
Correction is responsible for determining the placement of prisoners in 
programming and treatment.  I.C. § 19-2601(4) (emphasis added).  The plain 
language of this portion of the statute is clearly limited to the period in which the 
court retains jurisdiction, which may be “up to” 365 days, and, in any event, the 
language has nothing to do with the district court’s authority over placement in 
programming and treatment.  To the contrary, the language expressly states 
placement is the responsibility of the Department.  More importantly, the 
language Flores relies on says nothing about the court’s authority to reinstate the 
jurisdictional review period after jurisdiction is relinquished.  However, the 
sentence that follows the language Flores relies on does directly address the 
extent of the court’s authority after jurisdiction is relinquished by providing that 
“[t]he prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if not affirmatively 
placed on probation by the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4).  Because the district court 
actually relinquished jurisdiction and did not affirmatively place Flores on 
probation, Flores remained committed to the board of correction.  Flores’ 
argument that I.C. § 19-2601(4) provides statutory authority to reinstate a period 
of retained jurisdiction after jurisdiction is relinquished is without merit.   
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 Idaho Criminal Rule 35 should not be construed as allowing a district court 
to extend its jurisdiction beyond what is authorized by I.C. § 19-2601(4).  Rule 35 
provides, in relevant part: 
The court may correct a sentence that has been imposed in an 
illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of 
sentence.  The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after 
the filing of a judgment of conviction or within 120 days after the 
court releases jurisdiction.  The court may also reduce a sentence 
upon revocation of probation or upon motion made within fourteen 
(14) days after the filing of the order revoking probation.  Motions to 
correct or modify sentences under this rule must be filed within 120 
days of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence or order 
releasing retained jurisdiction and shall be considered and 
determined by the court without the admission of additional 
testimony and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by 
the court in its discretion . . .. 
 
I.C.R. 35(b).   
 In State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 71 P.3d 1065 (Ct. App. 2003),3 the 
Court of Appeals considered whether Rule 35 allowed the district court to place 
the defendant on probation after it relinquished jurisdiction.  The Court held that 
it could because “under the plain meaning of its language, Rule 35 authorizes a 
district court to diminish, lessen the severity of, or make more temperate a 
defendant’s sentence.”  Id. at 921, 71 P.3d at 1068.  The Court reasoned that 
because “[a]n order placing a defendant on probation lessens the severity of a 
defendant’s sentence,” such an order “falls within the district court’s authority 
granted by Rule 35.”  Id.  The Court further reasoned that “the power given by 
                                            
3 Although Flores does not discuss or cite Knutsen in support of his argument, as 
explained herein, the opinion appears to be directly relevant to Flores’ claim that 
a district court can, pursuant to I.C.R. 35, reconsider its decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction.  138 Idaho at 923, 71 P.3d at 1070.    
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Rule 35 would have no meaningful effect if the Court in reducing a sentence 
were not free to consider all alternatives that were available at the time of 
imposition of the original sentence.”  Id. at 922, 71 P.3d at 1069.   
 Addressing the interplay between I.C.R. 35 and I.C. § 19-2601(4), the 
Court stated:  “Like the retained jurisdiction program under I.C. § 19-2601(4), 
Rule 35 provides an exception to the expiration of the district court’s jurisdiction 
once the execution of a sentence has been ordered.”  Knutsen, 138 Idaho at 
922, 71 P.3d at 1069.  The Court thereafter rejected its previous statement in 
State v. Urias, 123 Idaho 751, 754 n.1, 852 P.2d 503, 506 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993), 
“that Rule 35 ‘does not provide a vehicle for ‘reconsideration’ of an order 
relinquishing jurisdiction,” and held that “trial courts are empowered by Rule 35 
to, in substance, ‘reconsider’ the relinquishment of jurisdiction on a timely motion 
from the defendant.”  Knutsen, 138 Idaho at 923, 71 P.3d at 1070.  Knutsen was 
wrongly decided and is in conflict with subsequent Idaho appellate decisions.        
 The Court “will ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior opinions unless it is 
shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the holding in the case has proven 
over time to be unwise or unjust.”  State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 
483, 490 (2012) (citations omitted); see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 
1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) (“[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern 
unless they are manifestly wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or 
unwise.”).  Knutsen is manifestly wrong.   
Article V, section 2 of the Idaho Constitution provides that the jurisdiction 
of courts inferior to the Supreme Court “shall be as prescribed by the legislature.”  
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A district court’s authority to retain jurisdiction was created by the legislature and 
is reflected in I.C. § 19-2601(4), which, as noted, allows a district court to “retain 
jurisdiction over the prisoner for a period of up to the first” 365 days “of a 
sentence to the custody of the state board of correction.”  During the period of 
retained jurisdiction, the court may elect to place a defendant on probation; 
however, if the court does not “affirmatively place[ ]” the defendant on probation, 
he “will remain committed to the board of correction.”  Id.  This interpretation of 
I.C. § 19-2601(4) is consistent with the Court of Appeals’ post-Knutsen opinion in 
State v. Petersen, 149 Idaho 808, 241 P.3d 981 (Ct. App. 2010). 
At issue in Petersen was the provision of I.C. § 19-2601(4) that allows a 
district court, in “extraordinary circumstances,” to extend its retained jurisdiction 
beyond the statutory maximum, which is now 365 days,4 for an additional 30 
days.  149 Idaho at 812, 241 P.3d at 985.  The precise question before the Court 
was “when that authority exists—either prior to or after the expiration of the 180-
day period of retained jurisdiction.”  Id. (emphasis original).  The Court held that 
“[t]he plain language of § 19-2601(4) demonstrates that the court may extend its 
jurisdiction by thirty days as long as it does so before the 180 days expire.”  Id.  
Thus, “any effort by the court to alter a sentence after a defendant has been 
remanded to the custody of the Board is an impermissible invasion of authority of 
the executive branch—specifically the Board and the Commission of Pardons 
and Parole.”  Id. at 812-813, 241 P.3d at 985-986 (citation omitted).   
                                            
4 When Petersen was decided, I.C. § 19-2601(4) provided for up to a 180-day 
retained jurisdiction period as opposed to the 365-day period that currently 
exists.  149 Idaho at 812, 241 P.3d at 986.   
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Consistent with the holding in Petersen, but inconsistent with the holding 
in Knutsen, I.C.R. 35 cannot alter a district court’s jurisdiction.  While a district 
court may use Rule 35 to “reduce” a sentence after it relinquishes jurisdiction, a 
court may not use Rule 35 to reinstate its jurisdiction.  Nothing in the plain 
language of Rule 35 or I.C. § 19-2601(4) allows a court to do so.  Even if Rule 35 
could be construed that broadly, as the Court construed it in Knutsen, such a 
construction must be rejected in light of Article V, section 2, of the Idaho 
Constitution and in light of the plain language of § 19-2601(4).  As the Idaho 
Supreme Court recently observed in Hoffer v. Sappard, --- P.3d ---, 2016 WL 
5416325 *13 (Idaho 2016) (citations omitted), “This Court does not have the 
authority to modify an unambiguous legislative enactment.”  If “a court rule is 
inconsistent with the constitutional allocation of powers between the coordinate 
branches of Idaho’s state government, it may no longer be applied.”  Id. at *14.  
Although the plain language of I.C.R. 35 is not inconsistent with I.C. § 19-
2601(4), if it is construed as it was in Knutsen, “it may no longer be applied.”     
Even if this Court concludes that I.C.R. 35 authorizes a district court to 
reinstate its jurisdiction under I.C. § 19-2601(4), such reinstatement is prohibited 
by § 19-2601(4) to the extent it would be considered a second period of retained 
jurisdiction.  The district court correctly noted that § 19-2601(4) allows a district 
court to “‘sentence a defendant to more than one (1) period of retained 
jurisdiction,’” but only “‘after a defendant has been placed on probation in a 
case.’”  (R., p.283 (quoting I.C. § 19-2601(4)).)  Nevertheless, Flores argues this 
restriction does not apply because he requested reinstatement “before 
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jurisdiction would have automatically lapsed” under the statute, and because he 
did not “ask for a new period of retained jurisdiction, he asked that he be allowed 
another chance to complete his rider.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)  The plain 
language of I.C. § 19-2601(4) does not support Flores’ arguments.   
The requirement that there be an intervening period of probation between 
periods of retained jurisdiction is not, as Flores argues, predicated on whether 
the first period of retained jurisdiction “automatically lapsed” or ended as a result 
of relinquishment.  Rather, the statute expressly states that a district court may 
impose more than one period of retained jurisdiction “after a defendant has been 
placed on probation,” I.C. § 19-2601(4); it is irrelevant whether the pre-probation 
jurisdictional review period “automatically lapsed” or was terminated by an order 
relinquishing jurisdiction.  It is also irrelevant whether Flores “ask[ed] for a new 
period of retained jurisdiction” as opposed to requested reconsideration of the 
court’s decision to relinquish because whether reinstatement of jurisdiction is 
appropriate under the statute is purely a legal question; it is not based on how 
Flores framed his request.   
If this Court concludes that a district court can, pursuant to I.C.R. 35, 
reconsider an order relinquishing jurisdiction and reinstate a defendant in the 
retained jurisdiction program, this Court should remand to the district court to 
consider that issue rather than accept Flores’ invitation to conclude, in the first 
instance, that reinstatement was proper.  See State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 
153, 730 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Ct. App. 1986) (citation omitted) (“When a judge 
exercises a discretionary function, such as ruling on a motion for a new trial, and 
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in doing so he applies an incorrect legal standard, the proper appellate response 
ordinarily is to vacate the ruling and to remand the case for reconsideration.”).  
This is especially true in this case given the ambiguity in the record as to whether 
“another opportunity at treatment in a security facility” in the form of a “Rider” still 
exists.  (PSI, p.50.) 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying Flores’ Rule 35 motion for reduction 
of sentence.  
 DATED this 21st day of October, 2016. 
 
       
 _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___ 
 JESSICA M. LORELLO 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of October, 2016, served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 SALLY J. COOLEY 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
JML/dd 
